We study how vertical integration affects the acquisition and transmission of demand information in regulated network industries. Demand information helps to set the access price, incentivize infrastructure investment, and foster competition in the unregulated downstream market. We show that when demand information is costly and private, the optimal access prices are independent of demand levels. Vertical integration then secures greater welfare in new markets where little demand information is available or where infrastructure cost is low, or when investing is highly risky. In the remaining cases, vertical separation is preferable.
The problem may be exacerbated by the employment of cost-based access regulation, as this leaves demand risk wholly to the investor. 1 This underinvestment problem raises the issue of how governments can stimulate investment in the infrastructure whilst at the same time ensure that competition will develop over the new network.
In this paper we study how access regulation and industry structure affect the acquisition and transmission of demand information that can help to promote competition and favour new infrastructure investment.
We consider a stylized model with an upstream market, which is a regulated natural monopoly, and an unregulated downstream market with imperfect competition, homogenous products, and demand uncertainty. We compare two industry structures: vertical integration, where the upstream firm is integrated with a downstream firm, and vertical separation, where the upstream firm does not operate downstream.
Our results show that under both industry structures the optimal access prices are independent of realized demand levels. Under vertical separation, demand information is not acquired by the upstream monopolist; under vertical integration it is acquired but kept private.
With this rigidity in the access price regulation, vertical integration may generate a trade-off. On the one hand, the downstream profit made by the upstream monopolist helps to incentivize investments. Ceteris paribus, this increases allocative efficiency. On the other hand, the upstream firm's knowledge of demand realizations may make it more costly for the regulator to induce the firm's participation, resulting in higher access prices.
Vertical integration is then shown to be preferable to vertical separation in new markets where little demand information is available; for low infrastructure cost and when investing is very risky, entry is profitable only for high demand levels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2 we discuss the background; in Sect. 3, the related literature. In Sect. 4 we set up the model; in Sect. 5 we discuss the benchmark case where information is costly but public. Section 6 analyzes the case of costly private information whilst in Sect. 7 we briefly discuss the case where public transfers are allowed. Section 8 considers the case where demand information can affect the decision as to whether to invest in the infrastructure. Section 9 concludes. All proofs missing from the text are in an Appendix.
Background
Over the last 30 years, regulatory policies in network industries have been mainly directed towards the promotion of competition. Entry has been promoted through the design of access pricing regimes and through reforms that provide for the (structural, operational, functional, or accounting) separation of the upstream supplier of infrastructure services from the downstream provider of retail services. 2
